Skip to Main Content
Government Leader - Managing For Results 1105 Government Information Group
 Current Issue Subscribe eSeminars Jobs About Us
Government Leader home > May/June 2006 issue



Delicate Balance

By Sami Lais

Whether Tensions Abound or Not, Career Execs and Political Appointees Need to Forge Partnerships

When the Presidential Personnel Office in January appointed Jeff Pon to be chief human capital officer at the Energy Department, Pon had mixed feelings about displacing the career executive in the position, Claudia Cross.

“I knew and respected Claudia as possibly the best human capital officer in the government,” he said. “But I came here because I knew she and I would be a great partnership in getting stuff done.”

Cross, now deputy CHCO, had known for months that a new CHCO likely would be named. And holding down both jobs, CHCO and human resources director, “was enormously demanding,” she said, but “it was with the expected mixed feelings that I received the news.

“However, Jeff and I had worked on some critical issues while he was at the Office of Personnel Management, and I was pleased to hear that someone who shares my passion and values would be coming to DOE. Jeff and I both approach this relationship as a partnership [that lets us] each focus on our own perspective.”

Pon and Cross appear to have forged an ideal working relationship at Energy. And it would seem on the surface that that many other political appointees and career executives across the government have similarly synchronous relationships.

"As a careerist, the more knowledgeable you are about the policy issues at hand, the more valuable you’ll be to the political leadership."
—Joseph Ferrara

Ask about the relationships between careers and politicals, and often you’ll get a stout denial that anything but respect, cooperation and enlightened self-interest exists between government’s top civil servants, members of the Senior Executive Service, and their bosses, the political appointees who serve at the pleasure of the president.

But reports of conflicts occasionally bubble up. For example, recent hostilities over a reorganization at the State Department are evidence that discord does sometimes occur. According to a Washington Post story, political appointees at State blamed the problems on career executives’ resistance to change, and career executives charged they had been shunted aside for political reasons. However, the story noted, “few people would speak about the controversy for the record.”

What, then, is the nature of relations between political appointees and career execs? Is it Hatfields vs. McCoys? Or Astaire and Rogers? Or a mixture of both?

For the most part, it’s a dance of compatible partners, according to one expert. “In many cases, things do go well [between career executives and political appointees],” said Joseph Ferrara, director of the master of policy management program at Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute and co-author with Lynn Ross of Getting to Know You: Rules of Engagement for Political Appointees and Career Executives, a report for the IBM Center for the Business of Government.

But because a senior executive’s milieu is behind the scenes, it can be difficult to know about problems between career executives and appointees until they boil over publicly, as in the State Department matter.

Carol Bonosaro, president of the Senior Executives Association, appreciates the dynamics as well as anyone. At its annual conference in 1998, SEA held a discussion on the topic and guaranteed anonymity to let people freely speak their minds, Bonosaro said.

“In the stark reality of career-political relations and government, ... uncertainty is the coin of the realm,” said a report on the discussion. “As one award-winning executive frankly stated, ‘You’re Distinguished Rank today, but dog meat tomorrow.’ ”

Most observers agree that if politicals and careers stick to certain roles, the relationship will go more smoothly.

“If you’re a political appointee, your job is determining what direction the business of your [agency’s] mission should be, and if you’re a career executive, your job is making sure that business gets done,” said Gilbert Johnson, senior manager for federal client services at CPS Human Resources Services of Washington, an organization that provides HR services to agencies.

“This is the way it is,” said Johnson, a former SES member. “If you’re a career executive and you want to be making policy, then you should get out of [the SES] and do something more political: Run for office, find a cause or an organization you can believe in and support it.”

Walking a fine line. Career executives must tread a fine line be- tween being yes-men and overstepping their authority, Bonosaro said.

“But sometimes, no matter how hard the career executive tries, it may be a case of oil and water. And it may be time for the career executive to go to another agency. But there are procedures that must be followed. It’s not like these folks are banished to the turkey farm until the next administration,” she said.

“Some political appointees come in thinking that all government careerists have horns and a tail,” she added. “Others have had some experience in the federal government or in state and local government and have an idea of how things work.”

Ferrara said the IBM Center study found there were myths on both sides. “And to the extent that politicals and careers cling to those ideas, the myths can cause tension between the two groups.” For instance, career executives, who serve an average of 26 years, sometimes at a single agency, may think of appointees as political hacks who know and care little about an agency’s history or mission beyond advancing their own ideology.

On the other hand, political appointees, who serve an average of nine years, usually divided among multiple agencies, may think of career executives as incompetents who just want a safe government job and who will resist serving the goals of a new administration.

“If either group believes these myths, they’ll have a hard time building a relationship,” Ferrara said.

Politicals can’t go it alone, Pon said. They need constructive relationships with the career execs they work with.

With Claudia Cross as deputy CHCO, “I was absolutely stacking the deck in my favor,” he said. “She has 20-year relationships in this department and with HR directors all across government. She knows how things work.”

In the IBM study, Ferrara said, he tried to come up with rules of engagement for both sides.

“As a careerist, the more knowledgeable you are about the policy issues at hand, the more valuable you’ll be to the political leadership,” he said.

Years in government have taught career executives some universal lessons about making their political appointees successful, Bonosaro said.

“You want to follow their wishes, unless of course what they’re suggesting is illegal or unethical,” she said. “You want to present them with alternatives and with complete information, but don’t overload them.”

For political appointees, Ferrara said, “we advised that if you listen to the advice of your careerists, whether you necessarily take all of it or not, you’re going to get the relationship off on the right foot.”

A former SES employee himself, mostly at the Defense Department, Ferrara added, “the political appointees I worked with knew which careers were the real experts, and they listened to them.”

“The not-so-smart politicals will shut those people out, particularly if they sense that their expert advice doesn’t fit with their political agenda,” he said.

Former SES executive Anthony Valletta, who retired in April 1998 as acting assistant secretary for command, control, communications and intelligence under Defense secretary William Cohen, concurred with Ferrara’s evaluation.

“I have to say that my experience with political appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was absolutely fantastic,” he said. “They were well-versed in the issues, and they knew the importance of people in an organization.

“This is not to say that every appointee was always the best person for the job, but the ones who were smart enough to trust us were the most successful,” said Valletta, senior vice president and director of the defense sector for SRA International Inc. of Fairfax, Va.

“I don’t know of any of our appointees who don’t rely heavily on the career executives,” said Ronald P. Sanders, the National Intelligence Department’s chief human capital officer. “They absolutely depend on them to make things run. They couldn’t do the job without them.”

But to believe that because such partnerships exist, to some degree and with some regularity, that well-publicized rifts between political appointees and career executives are the result of dissatisfied employees or attempts to sell newspapers would be naïve, other observers say.

“While the creation of the SES was, for the most part, a positive development in the evolution of the senior career civil service, there is widespread agreement that the reform has not fully lived up to its potential and has not significantly improved the relationship between political appointees and career civil servants,” write Mark Abramson and Paul Lawrence in Learning the Ropes, Insights for Political Appointees, published in 2005 by the IBM Center.

In January 2001, the Heritage Foundation published Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, a paper by George Nesterczuk, Donald Devine and Robert Moffit, which urged President Bush to manage the government bureaucracy more firmly. It warned that “Washington’s notorious Iron Triangle—the alliance of the federal bureaucracy, congressional staff and interest groups based inside the Beltway—is perhaps at its strongest in resisting civil service reform.”

The paper offered points of action, including an aggressive policy of ensuring that political appointees make key management decisions rather than delegating them to career executives.

“The new President must make liberal use of his power of appointment, get a loyal team in place to carry out his agenda and insist on accountability while maintaining a clear distinction between career and non-career employees,” it warned.

Proponents of this approach see the Bush administration as trying to create a more responsive and efficient government. “When the president appointed me, he wanted to make sure he had a good hand in helping to frame governmentwide change,” Pon said.

In the end, the distinction between political appointees and career executives should be subordinate to the process of reaching an agency’s objectives.

Said Pon: “It’s less consequential to ask, ‘What’s the tension between politicals and careers?’ than ‘What are the pertinent issues that will relieve a lot of our problems now and in the future?’ ”







This Issue
Succession Planning

A Healthy Agency is Key to Leadership Continuity

The Sage of Change Management

Delicate Balance


Shoulder
The Numbers: Career Execs and Appointees
Senior Executive Service Members
Career executives: 5,948
Noncareer executives: 631
Limited-term executives: 157
Total SES members: 6,736

Source: Office of Personnel Management Fact Book (2004)

Political appointees
Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation: 1,137
Presidential appointments without Senate confirmation: 320
SES positions filled by limited term appointment: 118
Schedule C excepted appointments: 1,596
Statutory excepted appointments: 624
Total appointees 3,795

Source: The 2004 Plum Book, Government Printing Office

 PARTNERS IN PROGRESS: Career exec Claudia Cross and appointee Jeff Pon have built a good working relationship at Energy.

(Image: Drake Sorey)
Shoulder
What Not To Do: Lessons for Appointees, Career Execs
Presidents routinely make major decisions that have an impact on the nation. But sometimes more ordinary individuals in government, political appointees or career executives, make decisions that have significant repercussions. And sometimes those instances serve to illuminate the roles of appointees and career executives.

Take the case of Teresa Chambers. The Interior Department in 2003 put Chambers, then National Park police chief, on administrative leave after she was quoted in the Washington Post as saying her department was understaffed and underfunded. Six months later the department fired her, charging that she also improperly lobbied Congress.

At issue was not accuracy—an Interior Inspector General report in 2002 had documented staffing and funding shortages in the National Park Police Department. The bottom line was that Chambers had overstepped the bounds of her role as a career executive, said Joseph Ferrara, co-author of the 2004 report Getting to Know You: Rules of Engagement for Political Appointees and Career Executives for the IBM Center for the Business of Government in Washington.

In speaking to the press and “in going around her chain of command to talk to the No. 2 political executive at the department, Chambers was perceived as acting more like a political appointee herself than a career manager,” said Ferrara, director of the master of policy management program at the Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute.

Chambers is still fighting to be reinstated and last December filed a suit for $2.2 million in damages.

It’s not just career executives who get into hot water for deviating from their roles, said Ferrara, who pointed to a recent Health and Human Services Department case as an example of how political appointees can get into trouble when they don’t listen to their career executives.

In preparing the fiscal 2005 budget, HHS chief actuary Richard Foster estimated the cost of a proposed Medicare prescription drug program at $534 billion. By contrast, the Congressional Budget Office estimate was $395 billion.

Legislators’ requests to see the internal estimate were denied, and Congress, under the impression the program would cost less than $400 billion, passed the bill.

When Congress became aware of Foster’s estimate, it held hearings on the matter. Foster testified that Thomas Scully, head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and an appointee, had suppressed his estimate.

The White House immediately distanced itself from Scully, saying he had acted unilaterally and without administration guidance.

In offering the estimate to Scully, Foster “did what a good career civil servant is supposed to do: He spoke truth to power,” Ferrara said.

Suppression of the estimate may have achieved a short-term gain, Ferrara said, “but at the longer-term cost of sparking a nasty dispute with Congress and demeaning the role career experts play.”



  Purchase A Reprint Link To This Page

 Sponsorship Information and Announcements

Top Stories from GCN


 Search

 Archives
 Print Edition
 E-Letters